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Introduction 
The  main  cognitive  evidence  that  manifests  itself,  in  relation  to  the 
religious  lexicon,  is  the  one  that  has  to  do  with  the  experience  of  each 
individual. The diachronic evolution of a word or phraseological unit
1 in terms 
of  meaning  may  show  an  important  link  with  another  basic  element  in 
cognitivism, imagination, whose meaning has been widely recognised (Johnson 
1987, 1993). At this point, not only the appearance of new meanings and new 
non-literal ones, but also the disappearance of those that become obsolete, has 
to be considered. Thus, individual experiences, besides everyone’s imaginative 
faculties,  become  rather  attractive  arguments  to  face  any  kind  of  lexical 
analysis from a cognitive perspective. 
In  the  case  of  the  English  religious  lexicon,  an  emergence  can  be 
appreciated; not only of the experience that has been lived, but also of what we 
have  named  imagined  experience  (Fernández  de  la  Torre  Madueño  1999). 
Thus, imagination has a lot to do with human experiences and mental faculties. 
We could argue that imagination is, in fact, a synthesis of both, as there is an 
interrelation  between  experiences  and  the  way  human  mind  processes 
categorise them. In the case of many words having to do with religion, as it 
happens with every abstract notion, experience may not always be a tangible 
part of the linguistic community’s background, as part of religious knowledge 
widely relies on metaphysics, the “superhuman” and the “beyond”. 
 
 
1 Phraseological units in both English and Spanish are contrastively studied in different 
works by Corpas Pastor, some of the most recent ones being 1998, 2000.  
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1. A triple vision of metaphor as a means of categorising religion 
A cognitive perspective of religion highlights the role of imagination as an 
essential element in the categorisation of the events of life. A series of mental 
processes  are  necessarily  present  in  such  a  categorisation,  which  shows  the 
relevance of imagination: 
1.  in  using  the  metaphor  as  a  means  of  trying  to  explain  the  complexity  of 
religious mysteries; 
2.  in  understanding  the  most  sublime,  non-tangible  concepts,  those  to  which 
humankind is not accessible; 
3.  in  creating  either  colloquial  meanings  from  religious  ones,  or  religious 
meanings from colloquial ones. 
1.1. Metaphor as an explanation of the mysteries of religion 
In religion, imagination does work as a nexus between two, more or less 
logical, ideas. However, imagination may be considered the only way of possibly 
understanding the complexity of certain ideas. That would be the case of the 
parables in the Gospels, told by Jesus to explain God’s doctrine, or the case of 
the metaphors used as a means to explain dogmas and mysteries of mythology. 
In this case, metaphor should be understood, not in cognitive terms, but in its 
traditional  sense  in  literature:  a  rhetorical  device,  a  figure  of  speech.  So  the 
metaphor would be the whole explanatory parable or tale. 
1.2. Access to the most elevated concepts by means of metaphors 
When a certain member of a religious community uses his/her imagination at 
a given moment, a theologically complex notion can be reached. Consequently, 
there is an access from the known to the unknown, as well as an alteration in the 
informative  effectiveness  –  either  by  lacking  or  by  having  another  type  of 
information – only possible through figurative language. 
Likewise, for an already established religious concept, the appearance of a 
new  focus  may  give  rise  to  its  reconsideration  from  another  perspective  – 
fantastic, artistic, childish, etc. – always different from the original notion. Now, 
the metaphor is not only a story to explain what heaven is, but also a rather 
distinct idea within the human experience. 
The use of metaphorical projections in religion allows us to get, not only 
upper, but lower levels of knowledge in different dimensions, and, in any case, 
always  in  the  “beyond”.  The  daily  goes  to  the  divine.  Thus,  metaphors,  in 
harmony with imagination and faith, become practically the only way to get to  
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such  levels.  Once  such  levels  have  been  reached,  human  experience  would 
appear as a rather isolated, or even non-existent, parameter. 
1.3. Increasing meanings: From the colloquial to the religious and vice versa 
However, imagination becomes an essential element in the constitution of 
those  metaphorical  processes  that  generate  non-literal  meanings  from  the 
religious field; thus, the significant role that imagination plays in the religious 
field deserves to be particularly remarked and accepted. Non-literal meanings are 
the result of projections between two domains but, in the cases we are focusing 
on, religious connotations are essential. The way the members of a community 
cope with their religion will determine their daily language as a mirror of their 
religion, and vice versa. 
At this point, there are projections of meaning from the colloquial to the 
religious field, and from the religious to the colloquial one. Religion is a part 
of everyday life, and such a fact is unavoidable when new words and meanings 
have to be coined. In this sense, religion itself becomes secondary: apparently, 
the goal does not seem to be the religious entity, but a colloquial one. 
2. Human mind and metaphor: Towards a conceptualisation of 
models in religion 
In  the  origins  of  Judaeo-Christian  tradition,  all  the  conceptually  new 
ideological material constituted a progressively assimilated experience, which no 
doubt incorporated a great deal of innovation. The religions from Asia and the 
East  were  the  basis  for  this  tradition,  so  elements  coming  from  there  were 
necessarily present in the ways the Judaeo-Christian religions evolved and were 
assimilated.  Previous  religious  knowledge  and  mental  images  developed  in a 
new  vision,  as  well  as  there  was  an  increasing  desire  and  necessity  of 
understanding and explaining all this. Thus, revelation brought along a certain 
number of metaphorical processes, taking common images of the daily lives of 
the first Judaeo-Christians, and consequently, the most familiar image schemas 
being present in them (Soskice 1985; Gerhart 1984). 
In the case of superhuman entities, every time an individual considers them, 
a double-sided reference may be unavoidably present in any of the three former 
perspectives suggested for metaphor as a means of categorising religion.
2 On one 
hand,  the  personal  experience,  either  as  a  believer  or  as  a  non-believer,  is 
necessarily present, and it will determine the way metaphors are focused and 
 
 
2 See sections 1.1., 1.2., and 1.3. of this article.  
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understood.  On  the  other  hand,  both  the  experiences  of  the  whole  linguistic 
community and the way they have been traditionally focused are part of each 
member’s personal experience. 
This double perspective of experience is present as well in every religious 
community.  As  a  series  of  religious  models  have  been  built,  metaphorical 
language  has  become  unavoidably  necessary  for  all  the  members  of  the 
community – past, present and future – to reach such models. A context and an 
environment  of  shared  feelings  and  assumptions  have  been  complementary 
elements  in  the  global  interaction  between  religious  models,  metaphor  and 
community. This situation takes place in the core of certain members suitably 
prepared and disposed to it. In other words, religion may have not been possible 
without the help and release of metaphors. 
We could argue that religion becomes a science (or at least a sort of it) if a 
theological  perspective  is  applied.  This  way,  metaphors  have  been  widely 
employed to explain dogmas and mysteries. In her work, Garfield (1986:6–7) 
raises the importance of metaphors describing science, because metaphors have 
been  used  to  describe  various  facets  of  the  scientific  process,  and  besides 
metaphors provide a means for popularising science. It may be inferred that the 
use of linguistic metaphors in religion makes feasible the access to a field of 
knowledge  which,  otherwise,  would  not  exist  in  the  linguistic  community. 
Religious  dogmas  and  mysteries  become  traditional  elements  in  religious 
linguistic communities, and by means of mental cognitive processes, they are 
possible to be grasped. It is important to remark that, in a linguistic community, 
there exists a conscience of such an assimilation of that “reality” which is neither 
literally nor absolutely apprehended. 
However,  this  superhuman  and  unreachable  dimension  may  remain  in 
human  minds,  as  far  as  individuals  reconsider  it.  Thus,  metaphor,  as  a 
manifestation  of  imagination,  could  be  focused  as  a  link  between  the 
superhuman and the human, apart from faith. Natural language is the tool for 
using metaphors in religion. The language of religion is full of metaphors, and, at 
the same time, it becomes a part of the daily linguistic routine, without any kind 
of conscience on the part of the users. 
Such  premises  are  parallel  to  science  and  the  scientific  fields.  Both  in 
religion and science, there are people implied in them, who become aware of 
deeper aspects of reality, as individual intuitions, being one of the consequences 
of the rise of many metaphors (cf. Soskice (1985)). 
We could add that, in studying superhuman elements in Christianity, this 
awareness is the result of God’s revelation to humans, or at least that it is one of 
the mainstays of Christian religion. As there is an increasing sophistication and 
complexity in the evolution of Christianity, models have been devised for an 
understanding of theological concepts, by means of cognitive processes in our 
minds. Metaphors do not only explain mysteries, unveiling this unknown world;  
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they  also  map  new  dimensions  of  people’s  lives,  probably  unexpected,  in 
principle (cf. Soskice (1985); Gerhart (1984)). 
In the production of non-literal meanings, a scientific perspective of religion 
may be pointed out: when non-literal meanings arise, the projection is, in most 
cases, connected to popular rather than purely theological aspects of religion. 
Nevertheless,  these  non-literal  meanings  –  which,  for  the  users,  may  seem 
literally religious no more – may help the comprehension and understanding of 
the scientific side of religion. 
To  finish  with  this  section,  Dirven’s  statement  seems  to  prove  the  way 
Christianity  becomes  more  and  more  complex,  and  metaphors  become  an 
essential tool in communicating such complexity: 
It is because of the new categories and distinctions discovered in an increasingly socialised, 
technical  and  scientific  world  that  new  linguistic  expressions  for  the  denotation  of  the  new 
experiences had to be found. The linguistic means par excellence is then the metaphorical process 
(Dirven 1985:24). 
2.1. The “beyond” from a metaphorical perspective 
Metaphorical  meanings  allow  cognitive,  semantic,  aesthetic  or  emotive 
functions  (Chamizo  Domínguez  1998:95–118).  This  line  of  implications  are 
closely connected with all the religious parameters which are necessarily present 
and intertwined in the heart of any Christian linguistic community. As metaphors 
and  non-literal  language  introduce  us  into  the  mysteries  of  religion  and  the 
entities  of  the  “beyond”,  these  entities,  once  assimilated  by  the  community, 
become instruments and vehicles to evoke the common and daily reality of our 
world. That is, there is a two-way process by which reality denotes the “beyond” 
and then the very reality again. 
The genesis of this concatenation lies in people’s knowledge of the world, 
beliefs, and contextual considerations. Apart from being part of language, non-
literal meanings concerning religion fulfil the role of increasing our knowledge 
about both this world and the other, the world of the superhuman. And one of the 
essential  basis  of  our  comprehension  of  religious  mysteries  is  precisely  the 
projection of our worldly reality onto the unknown: the way hierarchies exist on 
earth; the definitive, arbitrary and classic good-evil antagonism; the presence of 
pagan religions in Christian rituals, etc. 
All  these  rather  worldly  realities  have  shaped  our  knowledge  of  the 
superhuman  Christian  “beyond”,  up  to  the  point  that  Christians  can  hardly 
appreciate the “presence” of ancestral social structures in the human arrangement 
of the beyond. In any approximation to angels, devils or any kind of superhuman 
entity  there  is  an  atmosphere  of  mystery  and  esotericism. This is  present, in 
many cases, from the very world itself and the daily realities of people, although  
14
the community may admit all these entities as non-human, even without any kind 
of link with humans. After this removal, there is a “return” to the human world, 
when  the  use  of  forms  which  name  superhuman  elements  are  used  to  name 
human and earthly entities. 
With these considerations in mind, we may state that the use of non-literal 
meanings in religion is a way of increasing our knowledge of the world. It is 
also  a  way  to  project  our  world  in  a  dimension  we  have  been  introduced, 
experienced  and  “known”  by  revelation  and  faith,  if  it  is  the  case,  and,  of 
course, by the configuration of a linguistic – literal and non-literal – access to 
it. The apparent static nature of literal meanings turns into dynamic and non-
static when they participate in the production of non-literal meanings. A non-
literal meaning denotes an entity which exists in the real world, or in any other 
intangible  dimension  –  the  “beyond”,  fairy  tales,  monsters,  etc.  –  already 
accepted as existing in the community’s culture and traditions. For Chamizo 
Domínguez (1998:53–60) the use of metaphors yields, not only true or false 
information  about  an  entity,  but  a  specific  assertiveness  and  a  determined 
conceptualisation. 
We  may  add  to  this  that  there  exists  a  separation  from  the  religious 
atmosphere when the second part of the process is taking place. That is, the non-
literal meaning, which is produced from the superhuman world to the human 
one, becomes non-religious in meaning, but religious connotations are obviously 
present  in  the  new  non-literal  meaning.  Thus,  conventional  images  of 
superhuman entities provide a link between the meaning, which is considered as 
literal, and every non-literal meaning originated by mappings. Every person’s 
mental  images  for  such  non-literal,  figurative  meanings  are  constrained  in  a 
varying  degree,  since  particular  conceptual  metaphors  influence  people’s 
intuitions and their understanding of images. Speaker’s mental images for these 
intangible entities may be rather similar, although they are usually constrained by 
the conceptual metaphors that influence people’s intuition and understanding of 
their images (cf. Gibbs and O’Brien (1990:61–62)). 
In the case of the superhuman and the “beyond”, we believe that cognitive 
considerations should be especially and carefully dealt with. In a community 
(both linguistic and religious) there exist many image schemata that are based on 
the  community’s  bodily  experiences,  in  close  connection  with  the  individual 
perceptual understanding of the world (cf. Gibbs and Colston (1995)). Since the 
beyond and the superhuman world have emerged from cultural and religious 
myths or traditions, the direct perception of the world seems to be totally absent, 
at  least,  from  the  most  fundamental  considerations  –  that  is,  dogmas  and 
incomprehensible mysteries. According to all this, human experience would have 
nothing to do with the spiritual and divine upper – and lower – worlds of the 
“beyond”.  
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Through the analysis of how superhuman hierarchies are set out, we can 
get a vision of the social structures of the past. Thus, the various meanings for 
the  term  angel  make  us  feel  nearer  our  own  society  than  the  divine  and 
superhuman world represented by angels, archangels or thrones.
3 But is there 
any link between that set of creatures, carefully drawn, and the present manner 
of  focusing  life  and  organising  Western  society?  Is  the  whole  community 
prepared to understand why a certain meaning exists, and what is the reason for 
a word to have lexicalised a certain sense? In close connection with this, we 
would like to reconsider Payne’s (1991:59) unanswered questions concerning 
the Holy Communion Service of the Scottish Episcopal Church and the social 
vision underlying such a modern rite: What is the role of divine power vis-à-vis 
secular power? What are the bonds of evil […] from which the worshipper is 
set free? Either linguistic or purely religious views deserve being reviewed in 
order to update traditionally accepted considerations, so that new perspectives, 
probably closer to present-day communities, should be applied from the point 
of view of a new century. 
The world of the “beyond” should apparently be categorised according to 
non-human parameters. Apart from everyone’s faith in this world and in the 
Sacred Scriptures, we have no more possibilities of connecting and going into 
it,  so  human  structures  and  cognitive  processes  are  used  in  order  to  make 
feasible the access to a humanly inaccessible dimension. That is why there 
exists  a  two-sided  feeling,  implying  both  nearness  and  distance;  as  they 
correspond to our bodily structures and experiences on one side, and to the 
unknown and unreachable entities, on the other (Gorayska 1993). 
2.2. Humanisation of the superhuman 
However,  we  may  argue  that  the  general  vision,  and  then  the  image 
schemata, of the “beyond” is rather of human nature. Our bodily perceptions, 
experiences and understanding of the world include, not only the abstract and 
psychological  side  of  the  individuals  but  other  elements.  The  bases  of 
religion  are  both  abstract  and  foreign  to  every  human  being,  but  the 
assimilation of these floating concepts takes place thanks to the way people 
 
 
3 In  the  O.E.D.,  the  entry  order  offers  the  following information:  “II.  Rank  in  specific 
departments. 5. Each of the nine ranks or grades of angels, according to mediæval angelology. 
Also,  any  analogous  class  of  spiritual  or  demonic  beings.  The  nine  orders  of  angels  are 
enumerated first in the Pseudo-Dionysius (4th c.), according to which there are three hierarchies, 
each including three orders: these are seraphim, cherubim, thrones; dominations, principalities, 
powers; virtues, archangels, angels. (The names are derived from the mention of cherubim and 
seraphim in the O.T., and from words used by St. Paul in enumerating things in heaven and in 
the earth, in Coloss. i. 16, Ephes. i. 21.)”.  
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perceive their world around. As a result, there is a human perception of a 
non-human world, and a physically worldly atmosphere can be observed in 
such a perception. 
The  image  schemata  characterising  that  world  come  to  coincide  with 
certain  social  structures:  hierarchies  (angelic  triads,  devils),  heroes 
(archangels),  adversaries  (devils),  families  (Godfather  and  the  Son),  human 
roles  (tasks,  responsibilities,  charges,  missions),  etc.  Human  features 
characterise these superhuman entities, as a result of having applied the human 
image  schemata  to  such  superhuman  entities  the  community  has  been 
understanding and assimilating for centuries. 
We can see that the use of ‘angel’ in metaphors (My child is an angel) as a 
series of key features of the item ‘angel’ have been applied to the word ‘my 
child’. But to make this application possible, a few aspects from other different 
domains  were  necessary,  especially  if  the  concept  ‘angel’  was  obscure  and 
seemed  distant  for  the  Judaeo-Christian  linguistic  community  of  a  few 
centuries ago. 
One of the premises of Lakoff’s Invariance Hypothesis (1990) is that the 
mappings that take place between different domains must be done in a way 
inconsistent  with  inherent  target  domain  structure.  If  we  apply  this  idea  to 
superhuman beings, the members of the Christian linguistic community may 
infer  what  angels  are,  or  at  least  are  supposed  to  be  or  which  features 
characterise them. Thus, a few mappings and new meanings will be produced 
into the constraints established by the boundaries of knowledge; in this case, 
not the kind of knowledge the person has got as a result of direct connection 
with the environment and real world. On the contrary, there is neither direct 
reality nor tangible features nor natural perception of these beings, as there are 
for birds or tables. 
The members of the linguistic community may use both their metaphorical 
and non-metaphorical meanings
4 of the words for superhuman beings. But the 
mappings from the ‘superhuman domain’ are, in turn, possible because of the 
mappings that took place previously from the domains of humankind. Every 
sort of implication, either subsidiary or central, which seems to be originated in 
superhuman domains, will have been necessarily produced in real, human ones. 
Although  the  users  of  language  may  have  the  impression  that  an  inherent 
superhuman domain, parallel to the rest of human ones, has always existed, a 
consciousness about the true origin of such a domain must be recognised. Thus, 
human  traces  will  be  noticed  on  it,  in  fact,  the  human  social  structures, 




4 We have deliberately avoided using ‘literal’, considering Lakoff (1986). About the meanings 
of ‘literal’ and ‘literally’, see Nerlich and Chamizo Domínguez (2001).  
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3. Epilogue. Linguistic dimension: New meanings and the 
reconceptualisation of religion 
The new meanings, which can be mostly found in colloquial language, may 
be considered an interesting field of research that might even re-determine the 
present perspective of: 
·  religion or, at least, of certain lexical subfields of religion; 
·  the  hierarchy  that  has  been  established  for  such  subfields  (institutions, 
feelings, names, etc.);  
·  the importance of the different entities that constitute every one of these 
subfields; 
·  the divisions in these subfields, etc. 
The criteria of value and judgement of the linguistic community have been 
traditionally applied to religion as a whole. As well, its ideological elements are 
enriched with this new version of the lexical field, of the metaphorical processes, 
and the non-literal utterances. This particular linguistic perspective of religion is 
necessarily based on imagination, as previously mentioned. 
People’s experiences belong obviously to the domains of humankind. It is 
precisely imagination that projects those conceptions – which do not belong to 
human experience – to such domains from other non-experienced domains, but 
not necessarily unknown. From the projections of unknown concepts and unlived 
experiences, in the domains of humankind, it is possible to experience events 
never  lived  before  by  the  linguistic  community  as  a  whole  or  by  any  of  its 
members.  However,  it  is  feasible  by  means  of  imagination  and  the  way 
knowledge may help. When we talk about “imagined experience” we refer to 
those  ideas  and  concepts  which  form  part  of  legend,  tradition  or  theological 
doctrines, without purely human bases. Thus, the Holy Spirit/Ghost, the devil, a 
seraph or Pandemonium, considered in their original meaning, seem to be far 
enough from the domains of humankind to be found, on the contrary, in the 
superhuman domains. 
As  an  internal  and  deeper  relationship  between  humans  and  their  god, 
religion  implies  an  expression  of  the  emotions  at  a  very  particular  level. 
Metaphorical  language  has  been  largely  used  as  a  linking  tool  of  cognition 
between  human  understanding  and  feeling,  and  the  revealed  mysterious 
concepts.  In  order  to  conceptualise  their  unfamiliarity,  we  could  state  the 
presence of emotions, in a varying degree, in the exchange of associations both 
from non-religious to religious domains and vice versa. 
As an “intense emotional experience” (Fainsilber and Ortony (1987:242)), 
more  metaphorical  language  is  expected  than  in  less  intense  experiences 
(Fainsilber  and  Ortony  (1987:249)).  As  a  subjective  experience,  a  literal 
explanation  becomes  rather  difficult,  if  not  impossible.  In  the  case  of  the 
accessibility to superhuman knowledge, literal words may lack any sense for  
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most, or even all, members of the linguistic community. In other words, the 
apparent literality of the Bible needs an explanation. Love for God, confusion, 
faith, necessity to understand, etc., all being emotions and individual feelings as 
well as starting points of metaphorical reasoning in religion, we can argue how 
metaphorical  language  becomes  even  more  present  than  the  religious  words, 
since  the  former  can  practically  reach  everybody’s  minds.
5  Certain  religious 
terms have practically no metaphorical extensions, so they become considered 
properly literal. 
The creation of new meanings is closely connected with people’s, more or 
less  great,  range  of  experiences.  The  world  offers  a  specific  number  of 
categories,  which  are  differentiated  and  determined  by  many  different  ways 
(Gerrig and Gibbs (1988:5–7)). Thus, the creation of new meanings – or, at least, 
understood as such – from literal meanings in the religious field allows religion 
to  take  root  in  the  community.
6  The  use  of  certain  non-literal  meanings  in 
religion may reveal, many times, the deeper feelings and beliefs of the speaker. 
We can find many different non-literal examples in slang, some of them far from 
religious considerations, even disgusting for a believer.
7 On the contrary, such 
utterances may denounce, in certain cases, an attitude towards life, which may be 
a parameter for people to establish their beliefs. 
To  finish  with,  we  would  like  to  grasp  Wierzbicka’s  (1990)  plastic 
apprehension of the world categories through her view of colours, and how they 
are universal to humankind: 
[…] color concepts are anchored in certain ‘universals of human experience’, and that these 
universals can be identified, roughly speaking, as day and night, fire, the sun, vegetation, the sky, 
and the ground. Although the color sensations occur in our brains, not in the world outside, and 
their  nature  is  probably  determined  to  a  large  extent  by  our  human  biology,  to  be  able  to 
communicate about these sensations, we project them onto something in our shared environments 
(Wierzbicka 1990:99). 
She continues: 
To my mind, the question of mechanics of color PERCEPTION has very little to do with the 
question of color CONCEPTUALIZATION. Color perception is, by and large, the same for all human 
groupings […]  But color conceptualization is different in different cultures, although there are 
some striking similarities […] Whatever happens in the retina, and in the brain, it is not reflected 
 
 
5 The work by Adam Smith (1989) on linguistic changes in the Revised Anglican Liturgy 
offers how new forms have been devised in Anglican liturgy. Alterations in language respond to the 
purpose of making the liturgy betterly understood and shared by people (p. 269). If we consider the 
example  of  God  (pp.  274–276)  we  can  find  many  images  which  correspond  to  the  idea  the 
Christian community has of God. 
6 For establishing of intimacy, informing others about one’s attitudes and beliefs, etc., see 
Gerrig and Gibbs (1988:7–10 and references).
 
7 Many examples, taken from several European languages, can be found in Burgen (1996: 
34–55).  
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directly in language. Language reflects what happens in the mind, not what happens in the brain; 
and our minds are shaped, partly, by our particular culture. Conceptual universals […]  can be 
found through conceptual analysis, based on data from many different languages of the world, not 
through research in neurophysiology (p. 102). 
In the following pages, Wierzbicka deals with the contrast black/white (p. 
114–115), and reminds us the different kinds of levels in linguistic consciousness, 
as for instance tacit knowledge and scientific knowledge (p. 107). She offers a 
general  overview  of  perception  as  a  universal  experience,  however  linked  to 
cultural aspects. Language appears as a purely mental phenomenon. 
However, if we try to apply a religious dimension to her views, religion 
could be focused as a type of conceptual universals, as there is some type of 
religion in any human grouping. The colour perception black/white – dark/light 
can  be  found  in  the  conceptualisation  of  superhuman  beings,  not  only  in 
Christianity. With regard to superhuman beings in religion, there is no doubt a 
link between positive and light (white) and another between negative and dark 
(black). In positive beings (angels, God, Jesus, Virgin Mary, the saints, etc.) light 
implies the absence of sins, the presence of God, the inner transparency of their 
bodies, the eternal light, and so on. The meaning of darkness is linked to sin, the 
devils, and the eternal damnation.  
Thus,  there  is  a  plastic  vision  of  Christianity  as  something  worldly  and 
directly accessible to the community. All these form part of an image schema 
with different aspects of life joining in and intertwining in order to conceptualise 
specific religious environments. 
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